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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
WHAT STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?
Congress has responded to the concern of Americans with the
deterioration of their environment by passing the National Environmental Policy Act.' NEPA is the manifestation of the federal government's recognition of itself as a major pollutor and its attempts
to rectify the situation.' NEPA requirements have been diffused
throughout federal projects from airports3 to dredging permits';
each agency has the primary responsibility to administer NEPA's
provisions under the general supervision of the Environmental Protection Agency." Due to the Act's inherent ambiguities and inconsistant application by the various agencies, administrative decisions
pursuant to NEPA have come under challenge in the courts by
various environmentally concerned groups. The courts have responded with unpredictable decisions that have substantially limited the Act's effectiveness. NEPA, potentially the most powerful
tool to correct a waning environment,' has been stymied by judicial
confusion regarding both the degree of review NEPA mandates
and the standard by which this review is to proceed.
I.

THE SUBSTANTIVE

AND PROCEDURAL

NEPA
The substantive and procedural aspects of NEPA are set forth
in sections 101 and 102 respectively." The substantive aspects of
REQUIREMENTS OF

142 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4394 (1970)
2 Antipollution

(hereinafter cited as NEPA).

legislation has a long history in America. The first American

anti-pollution legislation was the Harbor Pollution Legislation S 1, ch. 496, 25
Stat. 209 (1888), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 441 (1958).

Federal restrictions on the federal government are not a new concept with
NEPA. In 1959, there was a proposal for the coordination of the executive branch
and the national goals of conservation. See Proposal Resources and Conservation
Act, S. 2549, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
3 Citizens Airport Comm. of Chesterfield County v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 52
(E.D. Vir. 1972).

'Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
542 U.S.C. S 4321 (1970).
'See generally Morningside-Lenox Park Assoc. v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132,
138 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
742 U.S.C. § 4331-4332 (1970).
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NEPA manifest the Act's ultimate goal, to "fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations." ' Accordingly, the federal government must coordinate
its plans and functions to assure that the nation enjoys a healthful,
productive environment and that succeeding generations will also
have an environmentally acceptable existence. The Act's procedural
requisites, on the other hand, comprise the steps agencies must follow to be deemed in compliance with the Act's goals. In theory,
if these steps are faithfully executed, the Act's substantive goals
will also be served. Not only have the Act's procedural steps at
times not been met,9 however, but it has become apparent that even
when these steps are complied with, the substantive goals may not
be met."
The major thrust of NEPA's procedural requirements are found
in section 102 (2) (c) in which the requisite procedural steps of
an environmental impact statement are spelled out. 1 The impact
statement must include the following: the environmental impact of
the proposed action,' environmental effects that will be unavoidable if the proposed action is implemented,"' alternatives to the proposed action,"' the relation between short-term use of the environment and long-term productivity,"2 irreversible committments of
resources the proposal will bring ' and results of consultation with
a federal agency possessing either jurisdiction or expertise cons42

U.S.C. 5 4331(b)(1) (1970).

See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers United States
Army, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
"0 See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers United States
Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
1142 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)

(1970).

U.S.C. § 4332(c)(i) (1970); See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
's42 U.S.C. 5 4332(c)(ii) (1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
1442 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(iii) (1970); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Citizens Airport Comm. of Chesterfield County v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 52, 59 (E.D. Vir. 1972).
142 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(iv) (1970).
1 42 U.S.C. S 4332(c) (v) (1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758 (E.D. Ark. 1971); see generally Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,
349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
1242
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cerning the proposed action.' The statement must also be written
in laymen's terms, striking a balance between a report written to
be understandable by non-technically oriented individuals, yet
scientifically grounded so that experts in the field will be alerted

to potential environmental problems. 8 An environmental impact
statement must be filed for every major federal action. What constitutes a major federal action is measured from the perspective of
cumulative impact."
The procedural requisites are jurisdictive; courts will demand
they be met and will not read resilience into them." A failure to

meet any one of the requisites will result in a judicial finding that
the impact statement is insufficient. An insufficient impact state-

ment shows on its face lack of agency compliance with NEPA
and will be overturned when appropriately challenged in court. 1
Another important subsection of NEPA, 101 (c) ' provides:
The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.
Since each person has a right to a "healthful environment" and
1742 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970); Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 758 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
"Sierra Club v. Froelke, 3 E.L.R. 20268 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 933 (N.D. Miss. 1972);
Proposed Environmental Protection Agency Reg. 6.45, 37 Fed. Reg. 883 (1972):
"Statements shall not be drafted in a style which requires extensive scientific and
technical expertise to comprehend and evaluate the environmental impact of an
agency action."
19See Guidelines for the Federal Agencies Under the National Environmental
Policy Act 1500.6 (1973), BNA ENvm. REP. FED. LAws, 71:0301: "The statutory
clause major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment is to be construed by the agencies with a view to the overall cumulative
impact of the action proposed, related federal actions and projects in the area,
and further actions contemplated. Such actions may be localized in their impact,
but if there is potential that the environment may be significantly affected, the
statement is to be prepared." Also, there has been considerable litigation concerning whether the Act applies retroactively to major federal actions commenced
before the Act's passage. See Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F.
Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970). Contra, Named Individual Members of San Antonio
Conservation
Society v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
"9 Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (C.D.
Calif. 1972).
11

See note 9 supra.

'42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970).
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the "responsibility to contribute" to the betterment and continuation of his environment, it follows that citizens seeking to accomplish these ends must have access to the judicial apparatus to implement their rights. The public participation foreseen by section
101 (c) has not become a working reality for at least two reasons.
First, the courts have not consistently held whether only the procedural aspects of NEPA are reviewable or whether the Act's substantive provisions are also subject to judicial review. Secondly,
even when substantive review is recognized, the courts have failed
to decide upon a standard by which to substantively review agency
decisions. The citizen attempting to assert his environmental rights
is thereby confronted with the obstacle of judicial confusion at
two levels.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

NEPA

AND

JUDICIAL REVIEW

NEPA does not include specific review provisions; therefore, the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are applicable."
Under the APA, a reviewing court may set aside agency action
when it is found to be unwarranted by the facts of the situation."
The APA entitles anyone suffering an alleged legal wrong resulting from agency action to judicial review of the claimed injurious
action." Agency decisions determined to be arbitrary or capricious,
or not otherwise in accordance with law, will be overturned by the
reviewing court" after the facts of the agency decision are subjected to a trial de novo by the reviewing court."
Although at least one court has viewed the NEPA as a mere
policy statement with no review of any type allowable," the procedural requirements of NEPA set forth in section 102 are gen23 5 U.S.C.
'45 U.S.C.

55 701-06 (1970)
5 701-06(2)(F)

(hereinafter cited as APA).
(1970).

U.S.C. 5 702 (1970).
U.S.C. S 706(2)(A) (1970). See note 61, infra.
275 U.S.C. S 706(2)(F) (1970).
2"Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 E.R.C. 1082, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1970): "Aside from
establishing the council, the Act is simply a declaration of congressional policy;
"5

215

as such, it would seem not to create any rights or impose any duties of which
a court can take cognizance. There is only the general command to federal officials to use all practicable means to enhance the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4331.
It is unlikely that such a generality could serve or was intended to serve as a

source of court-enforceable duties."
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erally regarded as being reviewable by the courts.' Presently, the
major issue before the courts is the question of the review of
NEPA's substantive provisions." Courts that deny substantive re-

view interpret NEPA as a purely procedural act. These courts
reason that if Congress had intended for the courts to make a substantive review, explicit language giving this power would have
been set forth in the Act.31 Since NEPA contains no specific substantive review provisions, the agencies are deemed to be in con-

trol of all substantive aspects of the environmental decisions free

from judicial review. ' This reasoning overlooks both the applica-

ble provisions of the APA and NEPA's legislative history. It is not
explicit language that subjects administrative decisions to judicial
review; on the contrary, clear preclusionary language is necessary
to place an administrative decision beyond the scope of judicial

review." NEPA contains no preclusionary language. The Supreme
'9 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971): "As . .. has [been] said of section 102 requirements:
'It is hard to imagine a clearer or stronger mandate to the courts.'" (quoting
Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. United States, F. Supp. -,
1 E.R.C.
1303, 1304 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Upper Pecos Assoc. v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236
(10th Cir. 1971); Bradford Township v. Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537, 540
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
U.S. -, 4 E.R.C. 1784; Alabama Gas v. Federal Power Comm'n, - F.2d __, 5 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 1973);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark.
1971); Citizens Airport Comm. of Chesterfield Co. v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 52
(E.D. Vir. 1972).
"*Originally, the major issue in environmentally related law suits was who
had standing to challenge agency action. With the liberalization of judicial requirements, however, standing is no longer a major obstacle in environmentally
oriented cases. See Ass'n of Data Processing Service, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D. D.C. 1971). See generally
Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 450 (1970). The
recent liberalization is illustrated by United States v. S.C.R.A.P., - U.S. -,
93 S.Ct. 2405 (1973). The Supreme Court ruled in this case that environmentalists
who were attacking an emergency railroad surcharge on the ground that the tariffadversely affected the recycling of glass and paper had standing under the
theory that the group had an interest in the environment that would be injured
if recycling were discouraged.
31 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers United States Army,
325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
"Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 425 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971); Morris
v. T.V.A., 345 F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D. Ala. 1972).
" Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956):

"....

Exemptions from
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Court has made it clear that when the APA is applicable, the instances when administrative decisions are not subject to judicial
review are "a very narrow exception."'" The question is not the

preclusion of judicial review, rather it is the extent of the review.'
The APA not only subjects agency decisions made in light of
NEPA to court review, but NEPA's legislative history as well illustrates the intention of Congress that NEPA be substantively reviewed by the judiciary.
Congress wanted environmental legislation that would be actionbased and objective-oriented through public participation." Henry
M. Jackson, one of NEPA's co-sponsors in the Senate, interpreted

the Act's objectives as being to create active participation in environmental management at all levels of federal action." Total committment at every level of federal action does not mean every level
except the federal courts. The combined House White Paper onA National Policy for the Environment envisioned the mobilization
of the people via the courts:
If America is to create a carefully designed healthful and balanced
environment, we must... establish judicial procedures so that the
individual right to a productive and high quality environment can
be assured.""
the .

. .

. Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed and

unless made by clear language of supersedure the expanded mode of review
granted by that Act cannot be modified." (quoting Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S.
302, 310 (1955)). Accord, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141
(1967): " . . . only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should courts restrict access to judicial review." (quoting
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962). Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972).
"Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). The
court was referring to 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970) which states that judicial review
is permissible " . . . except to the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review . . . " or " . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
8 Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411, 428 (1954).
"The question is not whether statutes preclude review but to what extent statutes
preclude review, not whether agency action is by law committed to agency discretion but to what extent it is committed." See generally JAFFE, JUDICIAL CON-

TROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

(1965).

"IS. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
81115 CONG. REC. 29087 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson): "If an environmental policy is to become more than rhetoric, and if the studies and advice
of any high level, advisory group are to be translated into action, each of these
agencies must be enabled and directed to participate in active and objective-oriented environmental quality must be made part of every phase of federal action."
(emphasis added).
"Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and House Comm. on Sci-
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It would seem anomalous to direct "objective-oriented environmental management," yet only allocate to the courts review of the
Act's procedural shell while skirting review of the objective-oriented goals." The policy goals of NEPA are a matter of balancing
opposing economic and social interests, a function the courts perform daily. The technical nature of many environmental problems
cannot obfuscate the basic social-economic balancing that has long
been, and must continue to be, a function of the judiciary."0
Other congressional statements also lend support to substantive
review. A dispute arose between the House and the Senate over
the proper wording of section 101(b). The Senate bill originally
stated that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right
to a healthful environment .. .", The House changed the statute's
language to its present form: "each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment."' The reason for the change was stated to be the uncertainty
of the House conferees in respect to the legal scope of the Senate
version.' The language of the House version can be interpreted
as a stronger mandate for the substantive judicial review than the
original Senate version. The Ninth Amendment states: "The
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The
ence and Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Congressional White Paper on a National Policy for the Environment. 2 (Comm. Print, 1968).
'9Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 298

(8th Cir. 1972): "Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to review substantive
agency decisions on the merits."
40
It has been suggested that there is a need for a separate court system spe-

cializing in these technical decisions. See Kantrowitz, Proposal For an Institution
For Scientific Judgment, 156 SCIENCE 763 (1967).
41
H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). The Senate made
this statement regarding its interpretation of the clauses' meaning: "[T]his subsection asserts congressional recognition of each persons fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment. It is apparent that the guarantee of
the continued enjoyment of any individual right is dependent upon individual
health and safety. It is further apparent that deprivation of an individual's right
to a healthful environment will result in the degradation or elimination of all of
his rights." S. REP. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969).

142 U.S.C. S 4331(c)
43

(1970).

H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1969). "The compromise
language was adopted because of doubt on the part of the House conferees with
respect to the legal scope of the original Senate provision."
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retention by the people of the "fundamental rights"" envisioned by
the Ninth Amendment would include the innate right of self-

preservation"5 in an inhabitable environment. The Senate's wording
is therefore a reiteration of an enumerated constitutional right. The
actual wording of NEPA, "Congress recognizes that each person
should enjoy a healthful environment" and "has a responsibility
to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment,"'" is a congressional mandate for public participation toward
the national goal of a clean environment. The courts are the necessary forum for the voice of the public participation contemplated
by Congress."
A conjunctive reading of sections 101 and 102 of NEPA indicates that the courts are not only permitted a substantive review of

agency compiled impact statements, but are directed by the Act
to do so. According to section 102, Congress directs that all public

laws and regulations of the United States be administered in accordance with the policies of NEPA "to the fullest extent possible."' This policy is not limited to section 102 alone, rather it
modifies the entire Act. Therefore, the goals set forth in section
101 must be administered to the "fullest extent possible." Full implementation should include meaningful participation by the courts.

The courts could not possibly insure full implementation of section 101 policy goals without substantive review of agency decisions.
III.

STANDARDS OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW

The judicial review of an agency compiled impact statement
"Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
' Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L. J.
309, 313 (1936). See also Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by
the People?" 37 N.Y.U.L.W. 787 (1962).
4642 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970).
4, Cf. President Nixon enunciated the need for this participation. "The task
of cleaning up our environment calls for total mobilization by all of us. It involves government at every level; it requires the help of every citizen." Man's
Control of the Environment, 87 CONG. QUARTERLY (1970).
4842 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). "The Congress authorizes and directs, that to the
fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States should be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set
forth in this chapter." S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1969): "To insure that the policies enunciated in section 101 are implemented, section 102
authorizes and directs that the existing body of Federal law, regulation, and policy
be interpreted and administered to the fullest extent possible . . ." .
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should serve two purposes. First, the review should serve as a
method of providing information to the public by setting a definite
standard against which the public can judge the environmental
attributes of a particular project. Confused statements lead to a
confused, uninformed public; an uninformed public cannot be the
participating public Congress contemplated." As stated in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Morton: "Congress contemplated
that the Impact Statement would constitute the environmental
source material for the information ... to enhance enlightenment
of--and by-the public.""*
The second function the standard of review should serve is to
allow for a definite measure by which the judiciary may review the
decisions of their brethren. An educated judiciary would in turn
lead to better agency decisions. This reasoning was followed in
EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Corps of Engineers when the court
concluded that the review of agency decisions would eventually improve the quality of the decisions.I The threat of a judicial reversal
of agency decisions due to their failure to meet NEPA standards
will compel the agencies to become more environmentally competent. A better informed public, federal agencies and judiciary
will necessarily lead to sounder environmental decisions.
To implement the benefits of sounder environmental decisions,
a definite, universal standard of review is necessary. The courts
have been unable to reach this standard. To a great extent therefore the policy goals of NEPA have been frustrated. The judicial
uncertainty and confusion regarding the applicable standards of
review and their application can best be illustrated by analysis of
a few actual decisions. These decisions illustrate two important
points on which the courts are confused. First, the courts are uncertain regarding what standard to apply. Secondly, once they have
decided on a standard, they are uncertain how to apply it. If the
courts themselves are confused, it is not difficult to see how this
bewilderment could funnel down to the modestly funded plaintiffs
attempting to protect their environmental rights.
" See note 38 supra.
50Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
51 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 299 (8th
Cir. 1972).
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The courts have adopted a variety of standards for substantive
review. In a leading case, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee
v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the District of Columbia Circuit Court denied the propriety of substantive review unless it is
shown that the agency decision was "arbitrary" or "clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental value."" The circuit court in
Calvert Cliffs' failed, however, to delineate what it meant by the
failure to give clear weight to environmental value. Is this standard
to be measured by NEPA substantive goals or the more narrow
environmental problems of a particular project's setting? The focus
of the Calvert Cliffs' standard is unclear.
A similar standard was set forth by the district court's determination in Scherr v. Volpe: "administrative determination is not to
be overturned by a court unless it is arbitrary and unreasonable." 3
Whether "arbitrary and unreasonable" is the same as the "arbitrary" or "insufficient weight" standard of Calvert Cliffs' is open
to debate. Both courts failed to substantiate their decisions with
clear references to NEPA provisions.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton," the D.C.
Circuit Court seemingly reconsidered what it regarded as the proper
standard. The circuit court stated that it would not "interject itself" into administrative determinations as long as the decisions
were in accord with "the end prescribed by Congress."" Whether
and to what extent this standard is consistent with the standard the
same court set forth in Calvert Cliffs' is not stated with any certainty.
The district court in Brook v. Volpe"8 further obfuscates the
proper standard of review by first stating that the substantial evidence rule is inapplicable, but that the court should perform a
"substantial inquiry" into the agency determination. 7 Does this
standard set forth the same concept as previously described stand52 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1115 (D.C.Cir. 1971).
51Scherr v.Volpe, 336 F.Supp. 886, 888 (W.D.Wis. 1971).
'Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
55ld.

at 838.

11 Brooks v.Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 269 (W.D.Wash. 1972).
"IId. at 281. The "4(F)" refers to the Department of Transportation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1653 (1970). The technical requirements of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2) (e)would preclude use of the substantial evidence test.
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ards or has yet another means of substantive review been developed?
The court in Brook defines "substantial inquiry" as being tripartite: did the secretary act within his authority; was his choice
arbitrary, capricious, "or otherwise not in accordance with law;"
and were the proper procedural steps followed."' The provision,
"or otherwise not in accordance with law," would seem to include
section 101 policy goals. Once again, however, the court failed to
substantiate its standard with specific NEPA language.
Perhaps the most adamantly worded case in favor of substantive
review by the judiciary of agency compiled environmental impact
statements is set forth in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps. of
Engineers."' The Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit stated that it
is the obligation of the courts to perform a substantive review. °
The court then set up the "arbitrary and capricious" standard for
itself. 1 Although citing Calvert Cliffs' as authority for this standard,
instead of using the "substantial weight" qualification as in Calvert
Cliffs,' the court in Environmental Defense Fund relied on other
considerations. In this case, the "arbitrary and capricious" decision
"represented a clear error in judgment."'" Thus, even courts claiming to use the same review standard create variances when the
standard is applied.
While the courts in numerous other fields of law have managed
to establish specific standards of review, the standards of review
used in the environmental field seem purposely vague. None of
the criteria thus far described deals with nor correlates to the actual
substantive provisions of NEPA. The courts' lack of familiarity and
expertise in deciding environmental issues may well be the cause
of the confusion. Regardless of this lack of familiarity, however,
51350 F. Supp. at 281 n.55.

511
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.
1972).
oId. at 298.
"Exactly what the "arbitrary and capricious" standard entails is a question

of factor balancing. Generally, an arbitrary decision is one without a rational
basis. See Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 126 (1962);
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 71, 75

(N.D. Ky. 1967); Eastern Central Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 239
F. Supp. 591, 594 (D.D.C. 1965).

62Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 300
(8th Cir. 1972).
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the courts should strive to set forth a consistent and workable
standard of review.
A standard that could meet the educational necessities of the
National Environmental Policy Act was posed in Natural Resources
Council v. Grant." The standard stated was:
The court's function is to determine whether the environmental
effects of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives are sufficiently disclosed, discussed and that they are substantiated by
supportive opinion and data.6 '
The reasonableness requirement serves the same purpose as the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard due to the rational basis of
both. The "substantiated by supportive opinion and data" criterion
would force the agency to compile a convincing public record of
the project's environmental effects-this could serve as an educational tool. The data supporting the agencies' conduct in the impactstatement should be laid out in nontechnical laymen's terms." This
substantiation could serve as a measure of what will and Will not
be acceptable agency action pursuant to the policy of the NEPA.
The reasonable substantiation standard can provide the necessary
precedent to form a consistent yardstick of agency conduct in environmental matters.
IV.

CONCLUSION

To effectuate a proper challenge to agency action, concrete findings are needed to compare and contrast past environmental decisions. A plaintiff needs precedent on which to build his case.
Precedent is not viable without a clear standard of review. These
requisites for effective citizen action do not presently exist. When
a plaintiff presents a case that was favorably decided on similar
facts, the defense has a ready defense that the standard under which
the cited court made its decision varies from the one the trial court
has used in the past. To remedy the confusion, two steps can be
taken. First, Congress could amend NEPA and add particularized
review provisions. Secondly, the Supreme Court, on the proper
occasion, could rule on the question of the most appropriate type
63 5 E.R.C. 1001 (E.D. N.C. 1973).

" Id.at 1004.
6 See note 18 supra.
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and standard of review." Supreme Court adoption of a standard
like that set forth in Natural Resources Council v. Grant is preferable.
A definite standard for substantive review is necessary for a
combined national effort toward obtaining the most "healthful protective, and asthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.""7
The judiciary is the proper forum in which to seek this protective
relief. As Supreme Court Justice Douglas recognized:
The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of our federal system. With the growing complexities of government it is often
the one and only place where effective relief can be obtained....
Where wrongs to individuals are done . . . it is abdication for
courts to close their doors. 8
The failure of the courts or the Congress to formulate a definite
standard of review for the impact statements has in effect closed
the courts' doors. In light of the detail and technicality of environmental protection, the absence of a specific standard by which a
plaintiff may challenge an agency decision makes his task nearly
insurmountable. In the absence of a definite standard by which a
plaintiff can measure his attack, "the most important single piece
of modem environmental law now on the statute books"'" is lost in
a maze of judicial technicalities and uncertainties.
Clay G. Small

" Justice Douglas has already indicated the need for this action in Sierra Club
v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 407 U.S. 926, 933 (1971) (opinion of Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). In this case, Justice Douglas pointed out
that the failure of the courts to review agency decisions from a broader view
than the substantial evidence test will lead, along with other factors, to the eventual demise of NEPA mandates.
6742 U.S.C. § 4331(B)(2) (1970).
8 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968)
(concurring opinion).
"N.Y. Times, July 17, 1973, at 36 (editorial). The quotation was a segment
of a vehement editorial in opposition to the Gravel Amendment that provided
for the bypass of judicial review of NEPA with reference to the Alaskan Pipeline.
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